Abstract-A modern vehicle contains many electronic control units (ECUs), which communicate with each other through the Controller Area Network (CAN) bus to ensure vehicle safety and performance. Emerging Connected and Automated Vehicles (CAVs) will have more ECUs and coupling between them due to the vast array of additional sensors, advanced driving features (such as lane keeping and navigation) and Vehicle-to-Everything (V2X) connectivity. As a result, CAVs will have more vulnerabilities within the in-vehicle network. In this study, we develop a software defined networking (SDN) based invehicle networking framework for security against false information attacks on CAN frames. We then created an attack model and attack datasets for false information attacks on brake-related ECUs in an SDN based in-vehicle network. We subsequently developed a machine-learning based false information attack/anomaly detection model for the real-time detection of anomalies within the in-vehicle network. Specifically, we utilized the concept of time-series classification and developed a Long Short-Term Memory (LSTM) based model that detects false information within the CAN data traffic. Additionally, based on our research, we highlighted policies for mitigating the effect of cyberattacks using the SDN framework. The SDN-based attack detection model can detect false information with an accuracy, precision and recall of 95%, 95% and 87%, respectively, while satisfying the real-time communication and computational requirements.
I. INTRODUCTION
oday's vehicles contain many electronic control units (ECUs) that communicate with each other through the Controller Area Network (CAN) bus to ensure vehicle safety and performance [1] . Emerging Connected and Automated Vehicles (CAVs) will have more ECUs and coupling between them due to the vast array of additional sensors, advanced driving features (such as lane keeping and navigation) and Vehicle-to-Everything (V2X) connectivity. The vehicle's interface with the outside environment, such as WLAN network for V2X communication and Bluetooth for mobile communication networks [2] , makes them much more open to the outside-vehicle environment, thus increasing the risk of attack upon vehicle computer systems and networks. It is now known that vehicle control is vulnerable to compromise from over-the-air software updates containing malware in which attackers gain access to ECUs. The in-vehicle network is thus open to a variety of vulnerabilities that create an attractive target for attacks, particularly false information injection attacks, that threatened the motorist of the vehicle attacked and those around that vehicle [3] .
A failure to detect false information attacks in real-time for safety-critical applications can cause traffic crashes, injuries, and death [4] - [5] . For example, during the braking process, if an attacker injects malicious messages, such as false longitudinal brake force (LBF) message into the CAN bus, the Anti-Lock Braking System (ABS) will fail, thus resulting in the wheel-lock phenomenon (i.e., an out-of-control vehicle) [2] , [3] . Similarly, false information received by an in-vehicle electronic parking brakes (EPB) system can wrongly activate parking brakes, and false steering wheel input can trigger the electronic stability control (ESC) unit to activate the vehicle braking system. The messages in a CAN bus are also quite vulnerable to attack via eavesdropping [6] . Indeed, in one such remotely launched CAN bus attack, the attacker eavesdropped upon and corrupted the messages within a single car, thus triggering a recall of 1.4 million other vehicles [7] .
The Software Defined Networking (SDN) paradigm offers new techniques for network security through a separation of the control and data planes [8] . SDN offers greater flexibility and resource management to defend against cyber-attacks while minimizing network data traffic congestion. Specifically, it simplifies network management tasks in terms of dynamic flow control, has a network-wide visibility with the global controller, is network programmable and rests upon a simplified data plane [8] . This study is novel in that the authors undertake for the first time to develop an SDN-based framework designed for the detection and mitigation of real-time false information attack on the ECUs through the in-vehicle network. Also detailed in this paper is a novel attack dataset for false information attack on the CAN bus, a machine-learning based attack detection model for the attack dataset, and the creation of several attack mitigation policies. The SDN controller will push the mitigation policy to the OpenFlow switches to deploy the updated security policies [9] .
Although cryptographic message authentication on received CAN frames are available to robustly prevent CAN bus message forgery, they require a significant amount of processing resources [10, 11] . They are also characterized by high message exchange latency, which sacrifices the CAN bus real-time processing and communication performance [12] . Statistical and machine learning (ML) methods require all possible types of CAN bus attack messages (with different value ranges and transmission behaviors) for training [13, 14] . In this study, we aim to detect false messages without such a The two major contributions of this study are as follows. We develop an attack model and create attack datasets for false information attacks on brake-related ECUs in an SDN based invehicle network framework. We then develop a machinelearning based false information attack/anomaly detection model for the real-time detection of anomalies within the invehicle networks.
We collect the dataset of raw CAN frames from the CAN bus of a vehicle, and pre-process that dataset to create a subset of CAN frames received by three ECUs related to braking actuation: ABS (Anti-lock Braking System), EPB (Electronic Parking Brake System) and ESC (Electronic Stability Control System). From this attack-free dataset, we generate an attack dataset containing false CAN frames generated by a fake malicious ECU node. We then develop an LSTM time series classification model using the dataset to identify anomalies or false information, and train the model offline using the attack dataset. We next use the Mininet [15] simulation platform in which we create an SDN-based in-vehicle network topology. Through our analyses, we evaluate the accuracy of the false information attack detection model. We create different LSTM model frameworks by tuning the hyper-parameters to obtain the best model for attack detection. We also use Mininet to evaluate performance of the SDN based in-vehicle network in terms of latency for communication as well as false information attack detection and mitigation.
The outline of this paper is detailed as follows. A discussion of the attack detection model and SDN is described in Section II, the SDN-based in-vehicle network framework is detailed in Section III, the study assumptions are detailed in Section IV, and the correlation analysis of the attack-free data is detailed in Section V. In Section IV, the false information attack modeling and misbehavior scenarios are described. In Section VII a machine learning-based false information attack detection model is developed, followed by a system-level evaluation of the SDN-based framework in Section VIII. The false information attack detection strategy is detailed in Section IX followed by concluding remarks in Section X.
II. RELATED WORK
The in-vehicle communication, including the connections within an autonomous vehicle controller network (e.g., the connections between CAN bus and ECUs, the ECUs interconnections, the connections between ECUs and actuators, and internal sensors and actuators themselves), are vulnerable to attack. The connections between onboard computers, which include physical connections (e.g., Ethernet, USB to sensors, HMI and brought-in devices) and wireless connections (e.g., WiFi to other devices / interfaces) are also more vulnerable to attack. As such, much research has been undertaken to mitigate compromised ECU functionality that can occur from inputs from sensors and other ECUs [16] . The consequences of such acts are quite severe given that these compromised systems can cause the ECUs to perform dangerous operations (i.e., disabling brakes). In the subsections below, the current state of research on the detection and mitigation of attacks on in-vehicle network and SDN-based network is described.
A.
Attack Detection Various countermeasures have been proposed to thwart possible ECU attacks. For example, Ao et al. constructed a sensor model to generate the interval of a given variable based on the sensor measurement and the error bound. If the sensor readings are not located at the interval, the sensor is considered attacked. However, this method has a relatively low attack detection accuracy. If the sensor that is attacked in turn modifies the sensor reading at a small level so that the modified sensor reading is still located within the value interval, this method will fail to detect the attack on a sensor. Park et al. [18] applied a system with multiple sensors to measure the same physical variable and used pairwise inconsistencies between sensor readings to detect malicious sensor attacks. Ivanov et al. [19] applied the fusion algorithm on multiple sensor measurements to estimate and compare the sensor value with sensor measurements to detect the attack on a sensor. Although they fused multiple sensor readings to determine the sensor value, they ignored the effects of the sensor measurement noise on sensor readings, which resulted in a low-level attack detection accuracy.
A series of studies were also undertaken to detect CAN busbased attacks [20] - [22] . Moore et al. [20] designed a datadriven anomaly detection algorithm to identify the signal arrival frequency as the feature of CAN frames for the detection of possible anomalies in the CAN bus. Hoppe et al. [21] proposed an anomaly-based intrusion detection algorithm to analyze the value and periodicity characteristics to detect attacks by noting any changes in those message characteristics. Cho et al. [22] extended a previous intrusion detection algorithm by integrating the clock behaviors of ECU transmitters and detected abnormal changes in the criteria to improve the detection efficiency. However, the ECU clock is affected greatly by some factors, such as operating temperature. Therefore, although of importance, the accuracy of these concepts in detecting CAN bus attacks was quite low, compounded by the fact that the emphasis was on detection, not mitigation. Moreover, ECUs can be hacked if over-the-air software updates are interrupted and malware is injected, which can enable remote access to any ECU. Then, the frequency of the CAN frame generation from a specific ECU will not change, only the data field will contain false/malicious data. This type of attack cannot be detected by detection methods that only rely on message frequency. Only methods that analyze the data field can detect an attack in this scenario.
B.
Software Defined Networking (SDN) SDN is an emerging technology that is now deemed a viable network security solution [8] . There are four advantages of implementing security solutions using SDN, which are summarized in Table I . First, the dynamic flow control mechanism allows the implementation of efficient flow-based detection and mitigation models. Second, the centralized controller allows the detection of network flooding and anomalies on a network level and subsequent global resource management. Third, network programmability allows the development of sophisticated and customized security measures. Finally, the separation of the data plane enhances the use of SDN in a security device and in the additional modules. Although SDN has been extensively used to implement network functions, only a few studies have been conducted to elucidate the security aspects of SDN, particularly the security of SDN and the security involving the use of SDN [8] , [23] - [26] Halba and Mahmoudi [27] presented an SDN based framework to enable safety and interoperability of networks for exchanging data between in-vehicle Electronic Control Modules (ECUs), such as, ABS (Antilock Bricking System) and ESC (Electronic Stability Control). The key feature of the SDN-based framework is that it is independent of ECU technologies and protocols which ensures network interoperability between different ECUs. Thus, the security solutions developed by levering SDN can be deployed to any kind of in-vehicle network. 
III. FRAMEWORK FOR SDN-BASED IN-VEHICLE NETWORK
As discussed previously, modern vehicles and AVs contain many ECUs that are interconnected via the CAN bus, through which they broadcast and receive data at high frequencies for efficient vehicle operation and safety. However, SDN is superior to traditional networks in terms of providing dynamic flow control, centralized network-wide monitoring, network programmability and a simplified data plane. SDN can also improve in-vehicle network safety and security. Indeed, one proposed SDN-based framework has a fast link failure recovery while maintaining real-time capabilities [27] . In this study, we present a framework for SDN based in-vehicle network and investigated the security aspect of this network. Unlike previous studies emphasizing DoS, fuzzy and impersonation attacks on the in-vehicle network, here we investigate false information attack from a malicious ECU connected to the network. We develop a deep learning-based detection model within an SDNbased in-vehicle network framework for detecting false information attack. We also develop an SDN-based mitigation strategy that uses information from the false information attack detection model to create mitigation strategies to halt the propagation of false information through the network.
The SDN based in-vehicle network framework for false information detection and mitigation is shown in Figure 1 . The white arrows represent the propagation of attack-free CAN frames, and the red arrow the propagation of false CAN frames. The OpenFlow switch is configured as a forwarding device to forward all data frames to other ECUs regardless of the information within the data frames. It also communicates with the SDN controller through the OpenFlow protocol, allowing the SDN controller to perform network-wide monitoring. The SDN controller can push updated routing tables to the OpenFlow switch in real-time, allowing it to re-configure the network. As such, the SDN controller acts as the operating system of the data layer. The controller is connected with the application layer through an API, and the application layer contains all the additional capabilities required for the network.
Three applications characterize this framework: simple switch, false information attack detection and attack mitigation. The simple-switch program configures the OpenFlow switch to function as a simple switch that forwards the incoming data frames to all other ECUs connected to it. The false information attack detection model investigates the data frames flowing through the OpenFlow switch to identify if there are some abnormalities or anomalies within the data. The detection model is trained offline because the training phase is timeconsuming, however the detection phase is real-time. The output of this model is the input to the attack mitigation model. The purpose of this model is to stop the propagation of false information through the network.
The basic SDN framework consists of the data, control and application layers. The data layer consists of the ECUs and the OpenFlow switches. In order to show the communication between different ECUs effectively, five ECUs are chosen. The sixth ECU is actually not part of the vehicle system but rather a malicious ECU that has connected to the in-vehicle network. ESC, ABS and EPB are brake-related ECUs. We are interested in investigating the CAN frames which are received by these ECUs. Therefore, we have considered two other ECUs, EMS and MDPS, in this framework. The actual vehicle network is an extension of this framework. Instead of communicating through CAN bus, the ECUs will communicate through an Ethernet network. A time-triggered Ethernet should be used to meet the real-time requirements of the vehicle network. Each ECU connects to a universal adapter, which can be termed as a legacy in-vehicle network (LIVN) to IP adapter. The function of the universal adapter is to re-pack the CAN frames into Ethernet frames and vice-versa. The LIVN to IP adapter extracts the CAN frames from the transmitted / received data, which contain Ethernet headers, Internet Protocol (IP) headers, Transmission Control Protocol (TCP) headers, CAN headers, and associated metadata [27] . One OpenFlow switch is connected to five ECUs. These OpenFlow switches, which merely forward data without any intelligence, receive and send data frames to ECUs using the LIVN to IP adapter.
The integration of the SDN-based in-vehicle network with an Ethernet backbone and CAN frames is an important part of this framework. The CAN frames have a specific format, which is not changed. The CAN frames have a specific format containing CAN ID, DLC (number of bytes in the data), DATA and Timestamp fields. Although the backbone is Ethernet, the functionality of the CAN bus is also retained in this framework. Using the simple switch algorithm in the SDN application layer, the OpenFlow switch ensures that data frames coming from one ECU is forwarded to all other ECUs in real-time. This framework offers the additional advantage of monitoring data frames, detecting false information attacks and updating flow tables of the OpenFlow switch to mitigate the attack in real-time.
IV. ASSUMPTIONS OF THIS STUDY
In this section, we detail our five assumptions of the study prior to our description of the analysis, each of which is described below.
Assumption 1:
A subset of the in-vehicle network is considered to explain the proposed framework effectively.
Assumption 2:
The training for the deep learning-based attack detection model occurs offline. The SDN application layer contains the application, which directly predicts the attack status based on data from incoming frames.
Assumption 3:
The ECUs receive data from different sensors within a vehicle, with the assumption that such data may contain inaccuracies or noise. However, since we found no data related to the sensor noise, these inaccuracies are not considered. The analog-to-digital conversion (converting from raw bytes to actual signal values and vice versa) step may introduce some data errors, which are also considered in this analysis.
Assumption 4:
A threshold of 0.7 is used to define the correlation among the features. If two features have an absolute Pearson's correlation coefficient greater than 0.7, then they are considered correlated. The threshold of 0.7 is selected based on a qualitative analysis of the dataset.
Assumption 5:
Each CAN frame has multiple signal values (values from multiple sensor readings) embedded within the data field. When the attack dataset is created from the attackfree dataset, only one signal value is manipulated at a specific timestamp, with the other signal values of the data remaining unchanged. This means that only the specific bits or bytes of the data are changed.
V.
DATA DESCRIPTION
A. Description of Attack Free Data
To show the efficacy of our developed SDN-based framework for in-vehicle security, we use the data from real invehicle CAN bus. Although other communication protocols, such as FlexRay, are available for the in-vehicle communication network, CAN is a universal and real-time messaging protocol in use in the automotive industry because of its lower implementation costs compared to FlexRay [28] , [29] . CAN is a broadcast-based network where every ECU can listen to the content of the CAN bus, thus making the bus vulnerable to attacks. After acquiring the CAN bus, the attacker accesses the CAN data frame content. The existing CAN bus dataset shows that the acquisition of the CAN data frame makes it possible to create a Denial of Service (DoS) atack, fuzzy attack and impersonation attack on the CAN bus [29] . The CAN bus data used in this study were collected from the authors' previous study on CAN intrusion. The dataset, which was actual CAN data from a KIA soul, was collected by the Hacking and Countermeasure Research Lab [29] . The raw CAN dataset, which contains 537 seconds of data, and 1,048,576 rows of CAN frames, is decoded using a generic DBC file for KIA vehicles. This DBC file is collected from the OpenDBC repository of DBC files created by CommaAI. As shown in Figure 2 , the dataset contains the CAN ID, DLC (number of bytes in the data), DATA and Timestamp fields.
The The dataset is shown in Figure 2 , and the DBC file is shown in Figure 3 . Note in Figure 3 that each CAN ID has a specific ECU associated with it, which is the origin of the CAN frame. Under each frame, there are multiple signals, each of which has its own specific decoding information (i.e. scale, offset and range). The ECUs which receive and use these signal values are also mentioned here. The EMS and MDPS ECUs send CAN frames to the brake related ECUs: ABS, EPB and ESC. These CAN frames, which contain readings from different in-vehicle sensors, are also received by the malicious ECU.
The malicious ECU then manipulates and forwards specific bits within the data field to the brake-related ECUs. As a result, the brake-related ECUs receive both the correct-and falseinformation signal values that are used in the attack detection model. Information on these features is summarized in Table II , which also contains the decoded information from the DBC file for the specific signals we consider in this analysis. The signals have been selected based on its reception by the brake related ECUs. In addition, it contains values such as scale, offset, range and correlation information for each signal. The correlation column specifies the other signals which are correlated to it. The details about the correlation analysis are described in the next subsection.
B.
Correlation Analysis of Attack Free Data Prior to creating the attack dataset and the detection model, we performed a correlation analysis among the feature set from Table II . The correlation between these signal values is important for the detection of false information. If the value of one feature changes, other feature values should also change if they are correlated. However, when there is an attack, other feature values remain unchanged making it possible for the detection model to detect a false information attack. The correlation among the variables has been included in Table II . Let us consider the feature TQFR, a signal that is correlated with the N, VS and TQI_MAX signals. The Pearson correlation coefficient is used to determine the correlation, with the colorcoded coefficient values shown in Figure 4 . The yellow color indicates a strong positive correlation, and the dark blue color indicates a strong negative correlation between the variables. For example, the correlation of TQFR with N, VS and TQI_MAX are -0.80, -0.77, and -0.84 respectively, which indicates a strong negative correlation.
VI. ATTACK MODELING AND MISBEHAVIOR SCENARIOS
In this section, we describe the false information attack modeling for the in-vehicle CAN networks and the attack scenarios for false information attack that we have used in our study. We first begin with the existing dataset and create an attack dataset based on the false information attacker's model and misbehavior scenarios.
A.
Attack Model After acquiring the CAN bus access, an attacker creates a virtual ECU and injects false information within the CAN network. In this context, an attacker acts as a legitimate ECU and injects false CAN frames within the CAN bus. This injection of CAN frames can jeopardize the other depended ECUs, which use the frames injected by the ECU created by an attacker. For example, the CAN frame with the CAN ID 316 contains the information of the braking status which is then used by the ABS ECU. The attacker first obtains the information of the dependency between the ECUs and then carefully crafts false information that is injected into the CAN bus. Using a real-world dataset of Kia Soul vehicle, we obtain the dependency of the ECU by observing the CAN data communication between the ECUs. As shown in Figure 5 , the ECU named EMS11 is characterized by a dependency on EMS12, EMS14, and EMS16. Thus, an attacker changing the EMS11 data field affects the EMS12, EMS14, and EMS16 fields. A CAN data frame contains the 8-byte data field where an attacker only changes the values of the following bytes (see Table III ).
B.
Misbehavior Scenarios We have created 11 false information attack scenarios based on the dataset as shown in Table III . For each signal information (11 signals in total) in Table III , we created a false information attack with a duration of 10 seconds for each signal. Our dataset contains the Kia Soul CAN bus data for a period of 537 seconds where there exist 1,048,576 CAN data frame from all ECUs. Of this dataset of 537 seconds, the dataset is divided into two sets: training dataset and testing dataset. Among all these ECUs data, we consider only the data from the EMS11, EMS12, EMS14, and EMS16 as they are related to the breaking and engine control systems.
An attacker can change the original data with a garbage value randomly with a value from outside the bound of the normal values. We first analyze the data to select the range of normal behavior from an ECU and generate a random value which is outside of the three standard deviations of the mean of the error (see Equation 2 ).
where, is the false information that is generated by the attacker;
is the actual value of a signal; is the added value to make out of the normal distribution of a signal value; is the standard deviation or error bound of a signal value; and are the minimum and maximum value possible value for a signal. To craft the attack data, an attacker creates false information data at ten-second intervals and only changes specific bytes within that 10 seconds. For the testing dataset, this attacker time is limited to 5 seconds. Figure 6 shows an example of the false data injection of the 6 th byte of EMS12 ECU from the time interval of 110 seconds to 120 seconds. Within this timeframe the value of the 6 th byte of EMS12, which contains the TPS signal information, was randomly selected having = 0, = 600, and = 0.03. The attacker then replaces a particular byte of a CAN frame as shown in Table III .
VII. MACHINE LEARNING BASED ATTACK DETECTION MODEL
The data-driven attack detection model will be in the SDN application layer. The model will be pre-trained with the attack dataset. While the system is running, it will detect, in real time, the occurrence of an attack. The training of the model will occur offline. In this section, we describe the offline aspects of the model, including model development, training and offline testing. As detailed in the previous section, we use 20 signals as input features to the attack detection model. Each input feature is a time series and the different input features also have some correlation with each other. However, the output of the attack detection model should be a binary value that indicates the current attack status (attack / no attack). Therefore, in this study, we investigate a machine learning based time series classification model. The model architecture is shown in Figure  7 . 
A.
Model Architecture The first layer of the model is the LSTM layer, which contains multiple LSTM neurons. Compared to the simple Recurrent Neural Network (RNN) neurons, the LSTM neuron has some additional operations that solve the vanishing gradient problem. Its primary feature is the cell state, also known as the memory, which keeps track of the previous timesteps of a time series. This feature is of particular importance here, as the variations in the input feature have some patterns that are captured by the LSTM neurons. The model can thus detect abnormalities in the input features. The LSTM layer will contain many LSTM neurons, the number of which is initially unknown. The number of neurons in the LSTM layer is one of the hyperparameters of the model, which will be described later. After the LSTM layer comes the fully connected (FC) layer, with the number of neurons in this layer also a hyperparameter. As the output from all the LSTM neurons is received by each neuron in this layer, the output of each neuron is a linear combination of the LSTM outputs. The activation function for this layer is the rectified linear unit (ReLU) function, which ensures that there are no negative outputs from any neuron. The link between the LSTM layer and the FC layer contains a dropout probability, which means that the weights of some links will be randomly set to 0. Dropout can reduce overfitting issues of the model. The value of the dropout probability is also a hyper-parameter of the model.
The final layer is the output layer, which contains only a single neuron. This output of this neuron is binary values of either 0 (no attack) or 1 (attack). The activation function for this neuron is the "sigmoid" function, which is the standard activation function for binary classification. The loss function of the model is the binary cross entropy function and the optimizer used is the Adam optimizer. The formula for binary cross entropy is given in equation 3. Here, H denotes the entropy (loss) value, yi is the binary output and P(yi) is the predicted probability of that output. From the equation, it is evident that a correct prediction would result in a value of 0 and an incorrect prediction would result in infinite loss.
The measures of effectiveness considered in this analysis are three standard measures for binary classification: accuracy, precision and recall.
B.
Training and testing The attack dataset described in the previous section has 500 seconds of data with 2,369,868 rows of CAN frames. At first, we extract a subset of the dataset containing only the CAN frames EMS11, EMS12, EMS14, EMS16 and SAS11. This subset of the attack data contains 268,645 rows of data. The dataset is divided into the training set and the testing set. The training set contains data from 0-350 seconds, and the testing set contains the data from 350-500 seconds. In terms of rows, the training set contains 173,914 rows of data, and the testing set contains 94,731 rows of data. The input features in the training and testing set is normalized between 0 and 1 using min-max normalization. As the output is binary, normalization is not required. 
C.
Hyperparameter tuning The model has multiple hyperparameters that require tuning to identify the model with the highest accuracy. In this study, four hyperparameters and their values used for tuning are listed in Table IV. For each hyperparameter combination, we train the model and generate the results in terms of accuracy, precision and recall. The results are summarized using Table V and Table VI.  The results in Tables V and VI Note that the 50-neuron, 50-epoch and 512-batch size model in Table V is the most accurate and the most precise (at 94%). This precision is also known as the positive predictive value, thus indicating an attack prediction accuracy rate of 94% accurate, and a false positive rate of 2.45%. Unfortunately, this model has a relatively lower recall score, also known as a true positive rate. This means that this model has a higher percentage of false negatives compared to true positives (11%) than the other models. The highest recall achieved with other models is 94%.
Note, as indicate in Table VI , that the use of the dropout increases the accuracy of the detection model. The best model includes 50 neurons, 50 epochs and a batch size of 128, with an achieved accuracy and precision score of 95%, and a false positive rate of 2.11%. On the other hand, this model has a relatively lower recall score, which means that this model has a higher percentage of false negatives compared to true positives (13%) than the other models. The highest recall achieved with other models is 92%. 
VIII. SYSTEM EVALUATION
We use a Linux virtual machine containing Ryu SDN controller to create our network topology [30] . As Ryu is a Python-based SDN controller, all hosts and switches are capable of executing python scripts. Therefore, we create a Python script for broadcasting and receiving CAN frames, and for measuring the overall communication latency.
First, we segment the attack dataset to create a separate dataset for each ECU (hosted in Mininet). We consider in this analysis six ECUs (EMS, ABS, ESC, MDPS, EPB and a malicious ECU), and five CAN frame types (EMS11, EMS12, EMS14, EMS16 and SAS11) associated with these six ECUs. EMS is solely responsible for broadcasting EMS11, EMS12, EMS14 and EMS16 frames. MDPS is responsible for broadcasting SAS11 frames. It is assumed that the malicious ECU also broadcasts all the frames, because it receives all of the data frames forwarded by the OpenFlow switch. The other three ECUs only receive these CAN frames from EMS and MDPS. This is a simple scenario in which we consider only a subset of ECUs from the overall in-vehicle CAN communication system. The refresh rate of each type of CAN frame is calculated from the attack dataset from the timestamps. The refresh rate of all five CAN frame types considered in our attack study is 100 Hz (i.e., 100 frames/seconds).
CAN frames can be sent sporadically or periodically. Sporadic messages usually have a higher priority and must be sent as soon as a specific event occurs to maintain real-time operation [31] . Periodic messages, however, have a lower priority and sometimes encounter delays due to the higher priority traffic in the CAN bus. In this study, all the CAN frames under investigation have a 100 Hz (i.e., 100 frames/seconds) refresh rate. According to the SAE standards, the latency for each periodic message should be less than or equal to its refresh rate, in order to maintain real-time operation [31] . Therefore, here we establish an overall system latency requirement of less than 10 ms, corresponding to the 100 Hz refresh rate.
As indicated in the system-level performance results in Table  VII the average latency at which ABS, EPB and ESC receives the frames is 5.91 ms. The data frames are sent from the EMS, MDPS and the malicious ECU at 10 ms intervals. The time was recorded when the first frame was sent from these three ECUs. On the receiver side, the time was recorded when all the frames were received by all three ECUs (ABS, ESC and EPB). The difference between these two timestamps gives us the total time for receiving all frames. The total transmission time is also recorded on the sender side when all the frames have been sent to the receivers. The difference between these two times gives us the average communication delay, assuming that there is no queuing delay. Note although that the latency requirement is 10ms for all message types, as listed in Table VII , the average latency is below that value. The maximum latency observed is 6.05 ms for message type EMS12.
In order to detect the false information in real time, the detection model must predict within this 10 ms timeframe. We trained and tested the detection model in a Nvidia GeForce GTX 1060 GPU with 3BG memory, after which the model was saved as a JSON file and the model weights were saved as an H5 file. Both the model and its weights were subsequently loaded into the memory and the 50 iterations of the testing times recorded for the same sample point. The average computation time for testing was 1.43 ms, and the average combined latency (communication latency and the computational latency) was 7.34 ms, which is still below the 10 ms threshold. As such, the SDN based in-vehicle framework satisfies the real-time requirements in terms of communication and detection. Compared to the CAN bus, this is a major advantage, since the delay can vary significantly based on message priority and data traffic on the bus. The SDN-based in-vehicle network can avoid these additional delays in the communication among different ECUs and in the detection of false information within the network, thus meeting the real-time system requirements.
IX. SDN-BASED FALSE INFORMATION ATTACK MITIGATION STRATEGY
The SDN application layer contains the deep learning-based attack detection model. For each data frame flowing through the OpenFlow switch, first, the attack detection model will detect and provide the attack status to the mitigation model. Upon receiving the attack status information, the attack mitigation model parses the CAN frames to identify the false information source (malicious ECU) by extracting the CAN ID that has false information. It then requests the SDN controller for an updated flow rule to update the flow tables of the OpenFlow switch. For example, in the presence of a false information attack, the SDN controller creates an updated flow table, instructed by the attack mitigation model. Here, the OpenFlow switch does forward data frames from the malicious ECU to other legitimate ECUs, thus halting the propagation of false information through the network. In legacy in-vehicle networks (i.e., CAN bus), all ECUs are connected by a common data bus in which they all receive data frames from that bus, which does not prevent the propagation of false information. However, in our developed framework, SDN-based in-vehicle network offers the advantage of real-time attack mitigation by halting this false information propagation from the malicious ECU within the invehicle network. In Figure 8 , we provide our exemplar of the mitigation model. 
X. CONCLUSIONS
In this study, we investigated the vulnerability of an SDN based in-vehicle network to a false information attack. We began by collecting a dataset and creating an attack model to launch false information attacks on brake-related ECUs. We then developed a machine-learning based false information attack/anomaly detection model that detects, in real time, any anomalies within the in-vehicle networks. The model framework was developed based on LSTM based time series classification concept. We also evaluated the accuracy of SDN framework in terms of detection and latency in terms of communication and computation. Our analyses indicate a 95% success in determining the false information attacks in realtime. We also investigated the overall network/system performance in terms of computation time for detection and overall latency. Results indicate that our SDN-based in-vehicle network detection model successfully detected false information in real-time, meeting the latency requirement for communication.
While CAN and FlexRay are the most popular technologies for in-vehicle networks, emerging Ethernet technology related to in-vehicle networks may well replace them. SDN is well aligned with the Ethernet technology, making it a potential tool for the future in-vehicle network. However, research is required to identify the advantages and limitations of this novel SDNbased in-vehicle network concept in emerging in-vehicle networks. This study will provide support in developing new standards for SDN-based in-vehicle networks and designing/developing robust SDN topologies and machinelearning based attack detection/mitigation models for in-vehicle networks.
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